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3CONTRIBUTION STATEMENT
Extant research on consumer debt has focused predominantly on debt repayment decisions
(Amar et al. 2011; Navarro-Martinez et al. 2011) and the effects of bankruptcy (Fay, Hurst, and
White 2002). However, actually repaying debt is a very uncommon behavior when it comes to
consumers with substantial debt. In such a situation, many consumers fail to reach out for help
and often avoid their creditors’ attempts to reach them. This is costly, for both consumers and
their creditors, because it easily results in additional fees and interest, of which collection is
uncertain. This research focuses on this phenomenon of creditor avoidance—a “head in the sand”
approach to personal debt management—which has been largely overlooked in the consumer
financial decision-making literature. Using a unique dataset from the UK’s Money Advice
Service, we find that debt-related shame and guilt, as well as the feeling of “drowning in debt,”
are associated with creditor avoidance. Other negative emotions, such as anxiety and
unhappiness, are not. Furthermore, creditor messages that match consumers’ pre-message
emotional states can risk intensifying the adverse effect of creditor contact on consumers, in turn
increasing creditor avoidance. In these circumstances, creditor messages may act as an additional
stressor rather than as a nudge towards repayment. The findings presented in this research
suggest that greater attention should be paid to the circumstances under which consumer debt is
not repaid. The results suggest that effective communication in debt management should not be
about “fearful persuasion.” Rather, we suggest that to mitigate creditor avoidance, messaging
tactics need to overcome or mitigate specific negative emotions that consumers have in relation
to their personal financial situations.
4ABSTRACT
Why do consumers avoid creditors when they send messages that put pressure on consumers to
repay their debts? This behavior, called creditor avoidance, ultimately hurts consumers but many
still engage in it despite it being against their best financial interests. To better understand factors
that contribute to this behavior, this article uses unique data from a survey of 3,287 over-
indebted consumers. Specifically, this research examines the association between creditor
messaging and consumers’ creditor avoidance, and how consumers’ negative emotions about
their debt circumstances are related to creditor avoidance behaviors. Findings indicate that debt-
related shame and guilt, as well as the feeling of “drowning in debt,” are associated with creditor
avoidance behaviors. Other negative emotions, such as anxiety and unhappiness, however, are
not. Further, creditor messages that match the consumers’ pre-message emotional state risk
intensifying the adverse effect of creditor contact on consumers, thus increasing creditor
avoidance. In these circumstances, creditor messages may act as an additional stressor rather
than as a nudge towards repayment. These findings have implications for how credit
organizations and policymakers communicate with, and assist, over-indebted consumers.
Keywords: financial decision making, communications, messaging, consumer finance, creditor
avoidance, emotions.
5Household debt is historically high in many countries, including the US and the UK.
Credit card delinquencies in the US, for example, have increased in the past year, which is a
trend not seen since the 2008 financial crisis. Additionally, in the UK, levels of consumer debt
have been rising faster than household incomes. These trends have raised significant concerns
about the unsustainability of current consumer debt levels (Bank of England 2017; Federal
Reserve Bank of New York 2018). Although high levels of indebtedness do not automatically
equate to consumers not paying their debts, as debt levels increase, there is a tendency for more
consumer debt to be left unpaid.
When faced with unpaid consumer debt, creditors (e.g., banks, credit card issuers,
consumer credit companies, and retailers) have been increasingly turning to third-party debt
collection firms. Collections agencies, as they are often called, manage large debt portfolios. For
example, in the US, debt collectors managed $792 billion of consumer debt in 2016, which was
approximately 22% of total outstanding consumer debt that year (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System 2018; Ernst & Young 2017). Collections agencies use various tactics to
get consumers to pay back overdue loans and credit card balances. Most commonly, debt
collectors send messages to over-indebted consumers via mail or call them as a way to make
them aware of their debt situation and to encourage repayment.
Despite these tactics, only a small proportion of debts are recovered from delinquent
consumers. For instance, in 2016, a striking 90% of delinquent US debt held by third-party debt
collectors remained uncollected (Ernst & Young 2017). The problem is similar in the UK, with
95% of third-party debt collection holdings uncollected each year (Credit Services Association
2016). These staggering statistics suggest that many over-indebted consumers simply do not
repay their debts. In other words, they live with problem debts for extended periods of time.
6While in this situation, consumers are frequently contacted by creditors or their debt-
collector agents, who attempt to recover unpaid funds from them. Consumers often blatantly
ignore such contact attempts. We refer to this phenomenon as creditor avoidance. It is a serious
financial problem with both macroeconomic and individual consumer consequences, and is
particularly troubling given the efforts to which creditors and their collection agents go to collect
delinquent debts from consumers. Creditor messaging, such as letters, phone calls, and other
tactics are intended to encourage repayments and often are designed to apply some pressure in
order to affect repayment. Such approaches, however, seem to be largely ineffective and might
have unintended side effects on consumer well-being not accounted for in the model of debt
collection, such as causing emotional harm.
Given the magnitude and seriousness of the problem of creditor avoidance, and the
apparent ineffectiveness of current debt-collection messaging practices, a better understanding of
the phenomenon of creditor avoidance is needed. This is the objective of this paper. Specifically,
we focus on over-indebted consumers and attempt to understand factors that contribute to them
exhibiting creditor avoidance behaviors. At first sight, avoiding repaying one’s debts is a
seemingly irrational behavior that is likely to be personally harmful, often with long-lasting
ramifications for one’s creditworthiness. Nevertheless, creditor avoidance is a common way for
consumers to “manage” their personal debt via a “head in the sand” approach. What triggers or
fosters this detrimental behavior is, however, puzzling. Thus, the aim of this research is to
identify some of these factors, which we hope can be used to inform public policymakers and
guide better approaches to creditor messaging tactics. We focus on over-indebted consumers
themselves and, specifically, how they feel about their debt situation and what they do (or not
do) about it.
7The current research is distinct from extant studies due to our focus on the phenomenon
of creditor avoidance. Prior work on consumers’ relationships with their debts and their
approaches to debt management has predominantly focused on consumers’ debt repayment
decisions (Amar et al. 2011; Navarro-Martinez et al. 2011) and the effects of bankruptcy (Fay,
Hurst, and White 2002), instead of creditor avoidance. However, as the statistics above illustrate,
actually repaying debt is a very uncommon behavior when it comes to consumers living with
problematic debt. Similarly, and unsurprisingly since it is typically used as a last-resort option,
bankruptcy is also very rare (e.g., fewer than 0.4% of US adults and 0.2% UK adults filed for
bankruptcy in 2013 and 2015, respectively; The Insolvency Service 2016; United States Courts
2013). Thus, our focus on creditor avoidance instead of repayment reflects a more prevalent and
realistic problem in the broader set of issues pertinent to consumer debt. We thus extend prior
research by examining the realities of being over-indebted with a particular focus on how this
makes consumers feel and how creditor messaging helps—or hinders—consumers’ abilities to
“dig out” of their over-indebted situations.
The question of what over-indebted consumers do outside of the relatively uncommon
outcomes of repayment and bankruptcy is largely unexplored. The creditor avoidance
phenomenon, which essentially means adopting a “head in the sand” approach to personal debt
management, is rife but not well understood. When in problem debt, many consumers fail to
reach out for help and often avoid their creditors’ messaging attempts. This is costly, for both
consumers and their creditors, because it easily results in additional fees and interest, of which
collection is uncertain. This phenomenon has not yet been researched in the consumer financial
decision-making literature, and the empirical evidence of who engages in creditor avoidance,
why, and critically, how they feel and then act, is limited.
8Ultimately, creditor avoidance is a highly consumer-relevant issue. Moreover, it is
squarely a marketing-related issue because communication in the form of creditor messaging
(e.g., letters, phone calls) to over-indebted consumers is an integral part of standard debt-
collection practice in most countries. For creditors to effectively encourage and help over-
indebted consumers to repay their debts, effective communication with consumers is essential.
Yet, we know very little about the effectiveness of creditor messaging tactics other than that
industry and government statistics suggest that they are largely ineffective. For example,
according to the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2016), debt collection is the largest
consumer financial products and services complaints category in the US, implying a disconnect
between creditors’ messaging efforts and consumers’ reception of these efforts. It is plausible
that debt collectors’ communications strategies and, specifically, creditor messaging tactics, are
not working. Moreover, creditor messaging that attempts to get people to repay debts might
backfire and trigger creditor avoidance.
To shed light on these issues we consider (1) whether creditors’ messaging tactics are
effective in establishing contact with over-indebted consumer debtors, and (2) conditions under
which messaging tactics are likely to be effective in mitigating creditor avoidance. We argue that
to mitigate creditor avoidance, messaging tactics need to overcome certain negative emotions
that consumers have in relation to their personal financial situations. Conversely, messaging that
is ineffective by exacerbating the problem of creditor avoidance is likely that which does not
overcome negative debt-related emotions and might in fact make them worse.
To address these questions, we analyze a unique dataset of 3,287 over-indebted
consumers in the UK. The dataset is the first of its kind, capturing consumers’ actual debt
management decisions, including creditor avoidance, their debt-related negative emotions, and
9types of creditor messages they have received. To preview our findings, debt-related emotions of
shame and guilt, as well as the feeling of “drowning in debt,” are each positively associated with
creditor avoidance behaviors. Other negative emotions, such as anxiety and unhappiness,
however, are not. Additionally, creditor messages that match the consumers’ pre-message
emotional states risk intensifying the adverse effects of creditor contact on consumers, thus
increasing creditor avoidance. In these circumstances, creditor messages may act as an additional
stressor rather than as a nudge towards repayment. These findings have implications for how
credit organizations and policymakers communicate with, and assist, over-indebted consumers.
BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUALIZATION
Not opening the envelope is a powerful metaphor to capture the essence of creditor
avoidance. Theories of information avoidance and coping suggest that this phenomenon may be
driven by affect-based motivations. Prior research in consumer behavior typically measures
effective behavior change (or the intention to) as a result of persuasive messaging (Andrews et
al. 2014; Keller and Block 1996). It does not, however, directly measure avoidance as an
(unintended) outcome of messaging tactics. Our primary goal is to understand under which
conditions messages, intended to persuade consumers, may backfire and lead to avoidance.
Information Avoidance
A plausible reason why consumers avoid creditors is that they avoid information about
their debts (i.e., not opening the envelope and, thus, putting their heads in the sand). Information
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avoidance has been studied in various disciplines, ranging from medicine to communication to
economics, and in the organizational behavior, economics, and psychology literatures. In
psychology and economics there have been recent efforts to develop theories on information
avoidance. In psychology, information avoidance is defined as the tendency to prevent or delay
the acquisition of available, but potentially unwanted, information (Sweeny et al. 2010, p. 341).
In economics a narrower range of phenomena are considered and information avoidance is
treated as an active decision made by individuals. Information avoidance is “active” if the
individual is aware that the information is available and has free access to the information or
would avoid it if access were free (Golman, Hagmann, and Loewenstein 2017).
In the current research, we adopt a perspective similar to that advanced by Golman et al.
(2017) such that creditor avoidance can be classified as active information avoidance. This is
related to what psychologists have termed “deliberate ignorance” (Gigerenzer and Garcia-
Retamero 2017; Hertwig and Engel 2016). Consumers know the information is available—
creditor messages are pervasive and hard not to notice—and is freely accessible. Yet they decide
to avoid it. We hypothesize that consumers’ information avoidance when in problem debt is
hedonically or affectively driven (Golman, Hagmann, and Loewenstein 2017), such that creditor
messages can make consumers experience negative emotions because the information inside
these messages carries direct negative utility for them. In an attempt to avoid these negative
mental states from arising, consumers may simply decide to avoid their creditors’ messages.
Prior work on information avoidance in consumer behavior research has not specifically
considered debt and creditor avoidance. Instead, the consumer literature on information
avoidance looks at how receiving threatening information in one domain (e.g., health) can lead to
less curiosity in another domain (e.g., charity giving) (Wang and Zhu 2014), and at how well-
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targeted messages can nudge consumers to engage more actively with their finances (White and
Sussman 2016).
Consumer behavior research has looked at avoidance as a behavioral outcome in the
context of coping. Drawing on coping theory (as opposed to information avoidance theory), prior
research has explained how consumers cope with negative emotions arising from stressful
consumption decisions (Luce 1998; Luce, Bettman, and Payne 1997). Coping, as a general
behavior, has avoidance as one form of response under the general category of coping responses
(Duhachek 2005). With the exception of work by Duhachek, Agrawal, and Han (2012), who
study coping (of which avoidance is one strategy and action or approach another) and message
framing, prior research has not explicitly linked coping (avoidance) mechanisms to effective
messaging effectiveness. Similar to motivations for information avoidance, creditor avoidance
may be an attempt to cope with the negative emotions arising from creditor messages. This
reaction, however, is the opposite of what debt collectors try to achieve: persuade consumers into
repaying debt.
Persuasion and Message Tactics
Debt collection letters are often perceived as threatening (Custers 2017). The reason that
these messages have threatening content may be that, generally, fear appeals are positively
associated with attitude, intention and behavior changes and the stronger the fear arousal, the
more persuasive it is. At the same time, as exemplified by creditor avoidance, fear appeals are
also associated with defensive responses such as avoidance. Which response is dominant in
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response to fear appeals (avoid or persuade), depends on the context in which the message is
received (Witte and Allen 2000).
Existing research on fear appeals (e.g., in smoking cessation) focuses on persuasive
messaging and intention to change behavior (Andrews et al. 2014; Keller and Block 1996), as
opposed to messaging tactics that may be damaging or counterproductive. This makes intuitive
sense, because in general research is aimed at nudging consumers towards decisions that improve
their welfare. This focus on adaptive responses (i.e., the intention to change behavior) however
ignores negative (and possibly unintended) consequences of messaging tactics, which may result
in an incomplete understanding of messaging effects. We study conditions under which
messaging tactics may backfire and lead to a defensive avoidance response, rather than adaptive
message acceptance (Witte and Allen 2000).
(Untailored) Framing
One reason for this backlash effect against threatening creditor messages may be that
these messages are not well-tailored to the consumers’ circumstances. An important moderator in
the effectiveness of message tactics is the consumers’ pre-message affective state. Messages
tailored to this state tend to be more persuasive. Gain- (loss) framed messages have been found
to be more effective in persuading recipients with a negative (positive) emotional state (Keller,
Lipkus, and Rimer 2003), and specific coping tendencies of negative emotions act as boundary
conditions (Duhachek, Agrawal, and Han 2012). In other words, not only the valence of pre-
message affective state matters for the effectiveness of messaging tactics, but also the specific
emotion and its respective coping orientation. For example, threat appeals, which represent loss
13
frames, lead to greater message effectiveness when matched with pre-message negative
emotional states typically associated with emotion-focused coping, such as fear and shame
(Duhachek, Agrawal, and Han 2012). Based on these prior findings we would expect that
consumers’ negative emotions in relation to their debt that are typically associated with emotion-
focused coping (such as fear and shame) do not significantly moderate the relationship between
creditors’ messages and avoidance.
In contrast, ad frames matching the affective state (i.e. messages that signal the same
emotion as the pre-message affective state) have been found to generate defensive processing,
being less persuasive and in essence inducing a backfire effect (Agrawal and Duhachek 2010).
Since creditors’ messages tend to be threatening, we would expect consumers to avoid their
creditors’ messages more when they are in a state of threat-related emotions.
DATASET
Overview
In 2012, the Money Advice Service, an independent body in the UK that aims to improve
people’s money management, commissioned a survey to analyze characteristics of the over-
indebted population. The survey was carried out by Public Knowledge, a market research
agency. Consumers were eligible to take part in the survey if they had been at least three months
behind with their bills in the last six months, and/or felt that their debts were a heavy burden. See
web appendix A for details. We use this survey as the basis for this research.
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The full sample covers 5,020 over-indebted individuals (mean age 41-45, 50% female).
However, due to missing data on key variables of interest we excluded 1,733 individuals from
the sample, resulting in a sample size of 3,287 over-indebted individuals used in our analysis
(mean age 41-45, 50% female). Respondents were excluded due to missing data if they answered
“don’t know” or “prefer not to answer” to key questions used in our analysis. A balance check
between the included and excluded respondents revealed no statistically significant differences
on socio-demographic variables such as sex, geographical location, and home ownership status.
We did, however, find that income and age statistically significantly differed between included
and excluded respondents, but in both cases the absolute difference between the two groups was
very small (less than 8% of 1SD). Thus, we are not concerned that our exclusion rule biased the
resultant sample in any meaningful way. See web appendix B for details. The mean age bracket
of the sample is 41-45 years, and the gender respondent divide is split evenly at 50%. The
median household income band of the sample is £20,000 - £29,999 and 64% are economically
active (either full time or part time employed). Further, 53% are financially responsible for
dependents, and 50% own their home.
In terms of the two sample selection criteria, 65% of respondents in our analysis report
their debt as being a heavy burden (referred to as subjective over-indebtedness) and 69% said
they are behind with their bills in at least three out of the last six months (referred to as objective
over-indebtedness). In addition, 38% agree or strongly agree with the statement “Sometimes I
don’t open letters or answer phone calls in case they are to tell me that I owe money.” This is the
creditor avoidance behavior of central interest for this paper. A further 54% are contacted by
creditors to recollect debt. Definitions of these measures are provided below, and web appendix
B reports summary statistics.
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An important feature of this dataset is that it provides information on real-world
consumer behavior of a sub-population that is typically difficult to study. Conventional
population tracking surveys or household surveys (e.g., census or other economic surveys) often
underrepresent over-indebted individuals, for instance. In practical terms, this means that
conventional surveys have subsamples of over-indebted individuals that are too small to allow
for detailed statistical analysis. For example, in prior work on over-indebted individuals in the
UK using household survey data, Gathergood (2012a) has a mere 142 observations of over-
indebted households.1 Perhaps more importantly, conventional survey-based approaches usually
do not jointly measure (1) creditor messaging received, (2) creditor avoidance behaviors, and (3)
consumers’ emotions towards their debt circumstances. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, this
is a unique and rich dataset that enables us to more completely understand how and why over-
indebted consumers respond to creditors’ messaging attempts in real life.
One concern, however, is that focusing on only over-indebted individuals can result in a
selection bias, thus limiting generalizability of our results to the general population. In our view,
this is not of serious concern since this research is specifically about consumers who are in over
their heads with respect to personal debt. Thus, our sample is appropriate given the focus of this
study. Notwithstanding, when compared to national UK averages on some key demographics,
our sample of over-indebted people is relatively consistent with the general population. The
gender distribution and geographical spread of the sample is representative of the general
population, although younger (under 18) and older (over 65) people are underrepresented
(consequentially, the economically active are relatively over-represented compared to the general
1 Of which 124 consumers are 3 months behind on at least one credit item, and 18 (1.5% of the total sample) of
consumers have real financial problems (but do not report to have fallen behind with many bills). Gathergood
(2012a) also classifies consumers who are 1 month behind on at least one credit item as over-indebted. These
consumers (92) are not included in the 142 observations used as a reference.
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population). The median gross household income band in our sample (£20,000 - £29,999)
corresponds to the UK fourth and fifth gross household income decile group in 2014 (Mfourth decile
= £22,360; Mfifth decile = £28,600). Our sample is, however, more frequently financially
responsible for dependents (Msample = .53; Mnational average = .29), and respondents are less likely to
own a home (Msample = .50; Mnational average = .66). And finally, unsurprisingly, respondents in our
sample2 are more likely to consider their debt to be a heavy burden than members of the general
population (Msample = .65; Mnational average = .20). Web appendix C provides further details on these
comparisons.
Variables
Over-indebtedness. The dataset contains three variables that measure self-reported levels
of debt. They are based on, or are variations of similar measures used in, the UK government’s
Wealth and Assets Survey conducted by the Office for National Statistics. The first variable,
which we label objective over-indebtedness, is a binary variable and one of the two respondent
recruitment criteria. It measures whether, in the last 6 months, a consumer has fallen behind on,
or missed any payments for credit commitments or domestic bills for any 3 or more months (0 =
no, 1 = yes). It is an objective measurement in the sense that it does not take into account
whether the missed payment is perceived as large or small relative to the consumer’s budget or
emotional bandwidth.
The second measure of over-indebtedness, as well as the second respondent recruitment
criteria, is a binary measure of whether respondents feel that their debts are a heavy burden (1),
2 In the remainder of this paper ‘sample’ refers to the 3,287 observations used for analysis.
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as opposed to somewhat of a burden (0) or no burden at all (0). We label this variable subjective
over-indebtedness, since it measures over-indebtedness scaled by emotional means. Web
appendix A provides details on the respondent recruitment criteria.
The third measure, labeled keeping-up commitments, asks respondents the extent to
which they feel they are keeping up with their bills and credit repayment commitments, from
“without any difficulties” (1) to “having real financial problems” (5). Table 1 reports survey
questions and scale points for each variable and correlations between these variables are reported
in table 2.
Creditor Contact. The survey captured five different ways in which creditors could have
contacted respondents with messages encouraging them to repay their debts in the last three
months: (1) sending letters or making phone calls, (2) sending a court summons, (3) visits from
bailiffs, (4) threatening eviction, or (5) threatening termination of electricity, gas, or water
supply. Of those respondents who reported receiving messages from creditors (53.8% of the
sample), the majority said they received letters or phone calls (92%), followed by receiving
threats to terminate utility services (23%), court summons (21%), bailiff visits (15%), and
eviction threats (13%). Moreover, while consumers can be subject to multiple types of creditor
contact, the average number of contact types (out of 5) was .87 (SD = 1.107, median = 1). As a
result, the distribution of numbers of contacts from creditors is skewed and we created a binary
variable that was equal to 1 if a respondent had been contacted by creditors in one or more of
these five ways at all in the last three months (and 0 if no messages or contact had been
received).
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Creditor Avoidance. This is a 5-item Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree)
in response to the statement “Sometimes I don’t open letters or answer phone calls in case they
are to tell me that I owe money”.
Emotions. The data contains six single-item measures of specific emotions that are
explicitly associated with debt, each measured on a 5-item Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=
strongly agree): (1) shame (“I would be too embarrassed to discuss my financial situation”), (2)
guilt (“I’m worried that other people think that my money difficulties are all my own fault”), (3)
drowning in debt (“Sometimes I feel like I’m drowning in debt”), (4) unhappiness (“My debt
makes me unhappy”), (5) worry (“Being in debt does not worry me”), and (6) anxiety/stress (“I
often feel anxious or stressed because of my debt”). In addition to these six negative emotion
items, we treat subjective over-indebtedness also as an emotion.
Other Variables. Several other variables that were collected as part of this survey are
used as control variables in our analysis, most notably a set of socio-demographic characteristics
and measures of respondents’ general attitudes towards debt. The former include age, income,
sex, financial responsibility for others, employment status, home ownership status, and
geographic region. The latter include debt-related attitudes measured on set of 20 5-item Likert
scales (1=strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree). Examples of these items include “debt has
negatively affected my family life” and “I can’t see that I am ever going to be in a debt free
situation.” For a full list see web appendix D.
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TABLE 1
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Type Construct Measure Mean SD Mdn Min Max
1 Over-
indebtedness
Objective
over-indebted-
ness
In the last 6 months, have you fallen
behind on, or missed, any payments for
credit commitments or domestic bills for
any 3 or more months? These 3 months
don't necessarily have to be consecutive
months. .69 .46 1 0 1
2 Subjective
over-indebted-
ness
To what extent do you feel that keeping
up with your bills and credit commitments
is a burden? * .65 .48 1 0 1
3 Keeping up
commitments
I'm keeping up with bills and credit
commitments,
- without any difficulties (1);
- but it is a struggle from time to time (2);
- but it is a constant struggle (3).
I'm falling behind with or missed some
bills or credit commitments (4).
I'm having real financial problems and
have fallen behind with or missed many
bills or credit commitments (5). 3.08 .94 3 1 5
4 Creditor
Contact
Creditor
Contact
Being contacted by creditors in 1 or more
out of 5 ways in the past 3 months.
- Receiving creditor letters or phone calls
- Receiving a court summons from a
creditor
- Being approached by bailiffs
- Being threatened with eviction
- Being threatened with termination of
electricity, gas, or water supply .54 .50 1 0 1
5 Number of
Contact Types
Number of contact types (out of 5)
received in the past 3 months. .87 1.10 1 0 5
6 Contact Type Received no contact (0), letters/phone
calls (1), abstract threats (2), concrete
threats (3). .94 1.09 1 0 3
7 Creditor
Avoidance
Creditor
Avoidance
Sometimes I don’t open letters or answer
phone calls in case that are to tell me that I
owe money ** 2.77 1.39 3 1 5
8 Emotions Shame I would be too embarrassed to discuss my
financial situation ** 2.99 1.25 3 1 5
9 Guilt I'm worried that other people think that
my money difficulties are all my own fault
** 3.29 1.24 4 1 5
10 Drowning in
debt
Sometimes I feel like I'm drowning in debt
** 3.47 1.14 4 1 5
11 Unhappiness My debt makes me unhappy ** 4.13 .91 4 1 5
12 Worry Being in debt does not worry me **^ 1.81 1.07 1 1 5
13 Anxiety/
Stress
I often feel anxious or stressed because of
my debt ** 3.98 .95 4 1 5
Based on 3,278 observations
* Binary Scale: A heavy burden (1), somewhat of a burden / not a burden at all (0)
**Likert Scale: strongly disagree (1), tend to disagree (2), neither agree nor disagree (3), tend to agree (4), or strongly agree (5)
^ In the analysis we use the inverse of this measure, where 5 indicates strongly disagree with the statement that being in debt does
not worry the respondent
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TABLE 2
CORRELATIONS
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Objective
over-
indebtedness 1.00
2 Subjective
over-
indebtedness -.48 1.00
3 Keeping up
commitments .17 .32 1.00
4 Creditor
Contact .47 -.13 .29 1.00
5 Number of
Contact Types .39 -.08 .27 .74 1.00
6 Contact Type .41 -.12 .25 .80 .89 1.00
7 Creditor
Avoidance .31 .00 .31 .40 .42 .40 1.00
8 Shame .09 .05 .12 .13 .18 .17 .37 1.00
9 Guilt .10 .09 .21 .18 .20 .18 .39 .42 1.00
10 Drowning in
debt .06 .27 .39 .22 .25 .21 .41 .31 .43 1.00
11 Unhappiness -.01 .22 .26 .08 .08 .07 .21 .23 .32 .43 1.00
12 Worry .11 -.23 -.23 .03 .10 .09 .00 -.01 -.12 -.21 -.33 1.00
13 Anxiety/Stress .00 .24 .30 .13 .13 .11 .26 .26 .36 .51 .59 -.31 1.00
Based on 3,278 observations.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
To test our predictions and check the robustness of our findings, we estimated two
regression models. The first model captures relationships between creditor avoidance and several
factors hypothesized to be associated with creditor avoidance, including creditor contact. The
second model tests our predictions around the moderating role of negative emotions in this
relationship, adding interaction effects between emotions and creditor contact.
Creditor Avoidance and the Moderating Role of Creditor Contact
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To identify which factors are associated with creditor avoidance, we first estimate
equation 1 which models creditor avoidance as a function of distinct negative emotions, creditor
contact, and, as control variables, a range of socio-economic factors and attitudes towards debt.
CreditorAvoidancei = β0 + β1 CreditorContacti +Σ     
 
β2k Emotionsik + θ ControlVariablesi + εi,
(1)
where CreditorAvoidancei is creditor avoidance for individual i measured on a 5-item Likert
scale (1=strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree), CreditorContacti is creditor contact measured as
an indicator function taking the value 1 if individual i is contacted in any of five ways,
Emotionsik is a seven-variable vector of distinct negative emotions for individual i (where k =
shame, anxiety/stress, unhappiness, guilt, drowning in debt, worry, heavy burden; and K = 7),
ControlVariablesi is a vector of individual characteristics for individual i and εi is the error term.
We model creditor contact as an exogenous stressor because it is systematically applied
as a function of a consumer’s financial situation, but is independent of the consumer’s
emotional state. As long as an account is in arrears and no contact has been established,
creditors follow pre-defined messaging strategies that are designed to “nudge” consumers into
repayment. As a result, any consumer with accounts in arrears is subject to creditor contact, but
the consumer’s emotional appraisal and subsequent coping decision as a consequence of those
attempts differs from person to person. We can test whether the association between creditor
contact and avoidance is conditional on a consumer’s particular emotion appraisal of the
situation (e.g., being unhappy, worried, or anxious as a result). This is estimated using a two-
way interaction in equation 2:
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CreditorAvoidancei = β0 + β1 CreditorContacti +Σ     
 
β2k Emotionsik +Σ     
 
β3k
CreditorContacti x Emotionsik + θ ControlVariablesi + εi,
(2)
We estimated these regressions with robust standard errors (note that effects are
comparable when not using robust standard errors), and with mean-centered emotion variables.
The results for both regressions are in table 3, with equation 1’s parameter estimates listed under
model 1a and equation 2’s parameter estimates listed under model 2a.
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TABLE 3
ASSOCIATIONS WITH CREDITOR AVOIDANCE
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Creditor contact .471 (.045)*** .490 (.045)*** .499 (.068)*** .524 (.067)***
Emotions
Shame .083 (.019)*** .083 (.019)*** .081 (.025)*** .078 (.025)***
Anxiety/Stress .009 (.028) .012 (.027) .039 (.033) .038 (.033)
Unhappiness .039 (.029) .042 (.028) .026 (.035) .028 (.035)
Guilt .078 (.021)*** .083 (.021)*** .068 (.027)** .075 (.027)***
Drowning in
debt .145 (.024)*** .151 (.024)*** .107 (.029)*** .113 (.028)***
Worry -.005 (.022) -.006 (.021) -.068 (.028) ** -.066 (.028) **
Heavy burden -.029 (.052) -.024 (.052) -.023 (.076) -.013 (.076)
Two-way interactions
Shame x Creditor Contact .005 (.035) .011 (.035)
Anxiety/Stress x Creditor Contact -.052 (.052) -.046 (.051)
Unhappiness x Creditor Contact .033 (.050) .034 (.050)
Guilt x Creditor Contact .020 (.040) .017 (.040)
Drowning in debt x
Creditor Contact .087 (.043)** .087 (.042)**
Worry x Creditor Contact .106 (.038)*** .101 (.037)***
Heavy burden x Creditor Contact -.028 (.089) -.035 (.088)
Socio-demographics
Gender
Male b.c. b.c.
Female .049 (.040) .049 (.040)
Annual gross
Income
£0 - £14,999 b.c. b.c.
£15,000 – £19,999 -.054 (.057) -.056 (.057)
£20,000 – £29,999 -.034 (.057) -.036 (.057)
£30,000 – £39,999 -.064 (.069) -.059 (.069)
£40,000 – £49,999 -.087 (.080) -.082 (.080)
£50,000 – £59,999 -.081 (.100) -.085 (.100)
£60,000 – £69,999 .132 (.129) .113 (.128)
£70,000 – £99,999 .210 (.141) .197 (.143)
£100,000 – £149,999 -.056 (.174) -.055 (.172)
£150,000 + .081 (.227) .093 (.230)
Objective over-indebtedness .255 (.057)*** .275 (.057)*** .246 (.062)*** .268 (.062)***
Keeping up commitments
Keeping up without
difficulties b.c. b.c. b.c. b.c.
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Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Struggle time to time .034 (.088) -.006 (.085) .038 (.090) .000 (.088)
Constant struggle .016 (.088) -.036 (.086) .029 (.091) -.022 (.090)
Falling behind .294 (.096)*** .246 (.094)*** .290 (.099)*** .243 (.096)**
Real financial problems .553 (.113)*** .503 (.110)*** .517 (.115)*** .469 (.112)***
Age
18 - 30 .073 (.124) .079 (.124)
31 - 40 .215 (.123)* .226 (.123)*
41 - 50 .116 (.121) .123 (.121)
51 - 60 .015 (.118) .030 (.118)
61 - 70 .052 (.103) .058 (.103)
75+ b.c. b.c.
Employment
Full-time .087 (.078) .085 (.078)
Part-time -.009 (.082) -.005 (.082)
Retired -.079 (.106) -.083 (.106)
Student / unemployed .026 (.087) .027 (.087)
Home maker b.c. b.c.
Homeownership -.081 (.042)* -.080 (.042)*
Dependents .019 (.040) .015 (.040)
Geographical location
East of England b.c. b.c.
London -.087 (.082) -.072 (.082)
Midlands -.161 (.080)** -.158 (.080)**
North East -.136 (.104) -.136 (.104)
North West -.183 (.083)** -.177 (.083)**
Northern Ireland -.075 (.146) -.075 (.146)
Scotland -.242(.089)***
-.230
(.089)***
South East -.133 (.083) -.127 (.083)
South West -.194 (.086)** -.191 (.086)**
Wales -.171 (.102)* -.161 (.102)
Yorkshire & the Humber -.033 (.087) -.015 (.087)
Attitudinal controls yes yes yes yes
Intercept 1.495(.304)***
1.422
(.254)***
1.479
(.311)***
1.417
(.261)***
Number of observations 3287 3287 3287 3287
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Moderators (i.e. negative emotions, with the exception of heavy burden (binary
variable) are mean-centered to improve interpretability).
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Main Effects. First, for model 1a (main effects only) we find a statistically significant and
positive association between creditor avoidance and creditor contact (coefficient estimate = .471,
p = .000). This is consistent with the expectation that fear appeals incite a defensive avoidance
response. Furthermore, model 1a indicates that feelings of drowning in debt (coefficient estimate
= .145, p = .000), shame (coefficient estimate = .083, p = .000), and guilt (coefficient estimate =
.078, p = .000) are statistically significantly associated with creditor avoidance. The other
emotions, notably anxiety/stress, unhappiness, worry and debt being a heavy burden are not
statistically significantly associated with creditor avoidance. This suggests that indeed, when
controlling for other factors, certain negative emotions are positively and significantly associated
with creditor avoidance, whereas other negative emotions are not.3
Moderating Effects. Second, we consider the interactions estimated in equation 2 (model
2a). We find that worry (coefficient estimate = .106, p = .005) and drowning in debt (coefficient
estimate = .087, p = .044) significantly moderate the association between creditor contact and
creditor avoidance. Both negative emotions towards debt intensify the adverse effect of creditor
contact on consumers, increasing creditor avoidance. This relationship is not moderated by the
other measured negative emotions towards debt (i.e. shame, anxiety, unhappiness, guilt and debt
being a heavy burden). The main effects in model 1a and 2a for most of these other emotions
(anxiety, unhappiness and debt being a heavy burden) are not statistically significantly different
from zero. To illustrate these results, we graphed the worry and drowning in debt x creditor
contact interactions in figure 1. For both negative emotions, the largest difference in creditor
3 The mean VIF for equation 1 is 2.85. The 13 variables with VIF scores > 2.5 are dummy control variables (age,
employment and keeping up commitments), and thus can be safely ignored as cause of concern for multicollinearity.
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avoidance seems to be concentrated among those consumers who have (strong) negative feelings
about their debts, where avoidance is higher for those who are being contacted by creditors.
FIGURE 1
INTERACTION EFFECTS
To further probe these interactions, we performed a floodlight analysis for all possible
values of the moderator (Spiller et al. 2013). Table 4 shows the results, which reveal that
respondents who are contacted by creditors have a stronger avoidance reaction at any given point
of intensity of the respective emotional state (i.e., all values of the emotional state—in this case
worrying about debt or drowning in debt—in the range of the data (1-5)), compared to those who
are not contacted and experience a similar intensity of emotional state. The exception to this is
those respondents who strongly disagree (1) to worry about their debt; this group of respondents
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does not react differently (i.e., does not avoid creditors more or less) regardless of whether they
are contacted or not.
TABLE 4
FLOODLIGHT ANALYSIS INTERACTION EFFECTS
Y (contact
= 0)
Y (contact
= 1)
Difference
(b1)
Robust
standard
error t(96) p
Lower
95%
C.I.
Upper
95%
C.I.
Worry about debt
Strongly disagree 1.698 1.859 .162 .130 1.24 .214 -.093 .416
Tend to disagree 1.629 1.897 .268 .100 2.69 .007 .072 .463
Neither agree nor
disagree 1.561 1.934 .374 .076 4.91 0 .224 .523
Tend to agree 1.492 1.972 .480 .067 7.15 0 .348 .611
Strongly agree 1.424 2.009 .585 .078 7.54 0 .433 .738
Drowning in debt
Strongly disagree 1.215 1.500 .285 .116 2.46 .014 .058 .511
Tend to disagree 1.322 1.694 .372 .084 4.42 0 .207 .536
Neither agree nor
disagree 1.429 1.888 .459 .067 6.85 0 .327 .590
Tend to agree 1.536 2.082 .545 .075 7.26 0 .398 .693
Strongly agree 1.643 2.276 .632 .103 6.16 0 .431 .834
Note: estimated using mean centered data.
Taken together, these findings suggest that negative emotions of threat (in this case,
worry, but not anxiety/stress) and feelings of drowning in debt moderate the association between
creditor contact and creditor avoidance such that the adverse effect of creditor contact on
consumers (i.e., increasing creditor avoidance) gets worse as these negative emotions towards
one’s debt situation get more severe.
Other Factors. Objective over-indebtedness (i.e., being behind on bills for at least 3 of
the last 6 months) is significantly associated with creditor avoidance (model 1a: coefficient
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estimate = .255, p = .000). Interestingly, when it comes to keeping up with credit commitments,
those consumers who have fallen behind on payments (model 1a: coefficient estimate = .294, p
= .002) or have serious financial problems (model 1a: coefficient estimate = .553, p = .000) are
the ones that are statistically significantly associated with avoiding creditors more. This
suggests that as long as consumers struggle, but have not yet seriously fallen behind on bills,
consumers do not put their heads in the sand as much as those that have started to fall behind or
have real financial problems.
It is noteworthy that in both model 1a and 2a socio-demographic factors (other than
objective over-indebtedness and keeping up commitments) are not significantly associated with
creditor avoidance, with the exception of home ownership and a few selected geographical
regions. Home ownership is a factor that commonly is statistically significantly associated with
debt management (Gathergood 2012b). This is not surprising, since the consequences of
ignoring mortgage debt are very serious. We further explore the role of the nature of debt and
associated creditor avoidance in the additional analysis discussed next.
Confound Checks
It is possible that the results are confounded by a number of factors, most notably
personal characteristics or environmental variables that influence the consumer’s emotional state
we observe.
Firstly, with respect to personal characteristics, the results presented above are robust to
leaving out socio-demographic factors (see table 3, models 1b and 2b). However, unsurprisingly,
the attitudinal control factors act as a confounder for the association between negative emotions
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and creditor avoidance (see web appendix D for details). We therefore include attitudinal
controls in all models, and the interpretation of results is thus dependent on statistically
controlling for these personal attitudes and excluding them would induce omitted variables bias.
Second, environmental factors could be a source of confounds. Recall that a creditor’s
decision to contact consumers is independent of a consumer’s emotional state (because they
cannot observe this state), but is a function of the consumer’s level of objective debt (which is
observed by the creditor). On the other hand, a consumer’s emotional state and subsequent
decision to avoid creditors (or not) is likely to be influenced by the consumer’s objective debt
levels keeping all else constant. We control for this correlation structure by controlling separately
for objective debt in both models. Additionally, we performed a robustness check to test whether
the observed interaction effect is independent of different levels of objectiveness. Adding three-
way interaction terms to model 2 (CreditorContacti x Emotionsik x ObjectiveDebti), these
interactions were not significant, thus indicating that the previously discussed effects between
emotions and creditor contact hold for all levels of (objective) debt.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our objective was to document effects and gain insights into an important, realistic, and
under-researched phenomenon in the consumer finance literature: creditor avoidance. A number
of complementary mechanisms fit this paper’s findings of significant association between
creditor avoidance and creditor messaging, exacerbated when met with pre-message compatible
emotional states. We discuss these possible explanations for our findings in this section, as well
as consider directions for future research. It is important to note that our goal here has been to
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document and better understand creditor avoidance using real-world data on the experiences of
over-indebted consumers. Although we speculate here on possible mechanisms underlying these
findings, we leave further exploration of these for future research.
Possible Explanations and Mechanisms
Taken together, our research suggests consumers may be predominantly advancing their
subjective welfare as opposed to their financial welfare when receiving messages that remind of
their problem debt. There are at least three mechanisms that may be of relevance in relation to
these findings. Two of these, the fear appeal hypothesis and the conceptualization of creditor
messages as attention nudges appear ineffective. The third, the emotional compatibility
mechanism is compatible with our findings. In what follows, we discuss each of these
mechanisms and how they are related.
Firstly, the fear appeal hypothesis (Witte and Allen 2000), which predicts that threatening
messaging tactics are effective persuaders leading to adaptive responses such as message
acceptance, appears incompatible with our findings; in the case of creditor contact—a type of
fear appeal—the defensive response tends to dominate the adaptive response, resulting in
avoidance behaviors. In other words, the fear appeal hypothesis appears subordinate when it
comes to debt repayment. The significant emotion moderators shed further light on why this may
be the case. Consumers who experience threat-related emotions associated with their debt (e.g.,
worry) turn against their creditors by avoiding them, whereas feelings of drowning in debt
exacerbate the association between creditor contact and creditor avoidance.
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This interpretation fits the emotional compatibility mechanism described previously
(Agrawal and Duhachek 2010), in which messages generate defensive processing when met with
a compatible pre-message affective state, inducing avoidance. If creditors’ messages are
perceived in a manner that fosters more worrying and a sense of feeling overwhelmed by one’s
debt situation, then this emotional compatibility mechanism may be what underlies the observed
effects. It may be that these feelings are what triggers information avoidance, and thus the “head
in the sand” approach to handling one’s debt situation in the face of communications from
creditors and their debt collection agents.
An alternative, but compatible explanation for our results is that creditor contact is an
ineffective attention nudge. Creditor contact attempts can function as reminders, that would
presumably nudge consumers’ limited attention towards debt repayment. Based on rational
choice theory, we would expect such reminders to reduce avoidance. Behavioral science suggests
that present bias or a preference for instant gratification leads consumers to prioritize
consumption today over planning for tomorrow (Lynch and Zauberman 2006; Zauberman et al.
2009). Limited attention is likely to aggravate this problem; when confronted with many
demands, a focus on one issue (e.g., making ends meet today), may lead to neglect of others, in
particular the less-pressing, long-term goals (Zinman and Karlan 2015). Reminders have been
proposed to serve as a means to combat such attentional bias by increasing the salience of the
piece of information that should lead consumers to less biased decisions. The hypothesized
mechanism behind these reminders is that they mitigate limited attention to saving- or debt
repayment goals, and bring them back to “the top of mind” (Karlan et al. 2016).
Our results suggest that this nudge is ineffective when it comes to repaying problem debt.
Moreover, the fact that various emotions are statistically significantly associated with creditor
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avoidance also when consumers are not contacted implies that (not) dealing with debt is not a
matter of salience; also when not being reminded about debt are distinct negative emotions
significantly associated with creditor avoidance. Rather, creditor contact may be predominantly
perceived as an environmental stressor, leading to avoidance. Psychological health and problem
debt has repeatedly been linked before (Bridges and Disney 2010; Brown, Taylor, and Wheatley
Price 2005), and having problem debt has been found to worsen psychological health
(Gathergood 2012b). Reminders about debt in the form of creditor contact may in fact backfire
and be perceived as a stressor, leading consumers to avoid their creditors more, rather than less.
Indeed, reminders of resource scarcity may be different in nature from reminders that
encourage consumers to for example save money or energy, or to go to the gym. Reminders
about the latter have generally been found to be effective behavioral nudges (Calzolari and
Nardotto 2016), whereas reminders of the former, resource scarcity, have, for example, been
found to activate a competitive orientation, resulting in spending decisions that promote
consumers’ own welfare (Roux, Goldsmith, and Bonezzi 2015). Further exploring the theoretical
connections between reminders of resource scarcity, fear appeals and persuasive communication
appears imperative.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
There are at least three potential limitations of the survey-based method used in this
paper: self-reporting bias, endogeneity bias due to omitted variables or simultaneous causality,
and the inability to distinguish the dispositional from the circumstantial element in creditor
avoidance. These limitations, in combination with the effects documented in this paper, give rise
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to future research directions. First, self-reporting bias may be at play, for example, when asking
respondents about their mental states in relation to debt. Second, given the data structure, which
is cross-sectional survey data without exogenous variation, causality cannot be inferred. Causal
inference, however, is not the focus of this research. Rather, our primary goal is to determine
what factors are associated with creditor avoidance, an intriguing phenomenon and an important,
widespread behavior with real economic and emotional well-being implications. Our findings
provide important guidance for both consumer protection regulation and creditors, and also
demonstrate that existing administrative datasets can offer valuable insights about consumer
behavior phenomena.
Nevertheless, an important direction for future research is to better understand the
underlying mechanisms and to identify causally the relationship between creditor contact and
creditor avoidance. The consequences of unpaid debts are large as they impact both financial and
emotional well-being, at societal as well as at the individual level. Furthermore, a lot of our
results are indications of the fact that the stage of indebtedness a consumer finds him or herself
in matters, because the extent to which certain debt-related emotions are experienced will
inextricably (but not necessarily completely) be associated with one’s stage of indebtedness. For
example, the extent of over-indebtedness (objective debt levels or extent to which a consumer is
keeping up with commitments) is strongly correlated with creditor avoidance. Better
understanding the moderating role of the stage of indebtedness (in addition to the moderating
role of selected negative emotions towards debt, as we have examined in this study) in the
relationship between creditor contact and creditor avoidance is an important direction for future
research.
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Third, avoidance, and coping strategies in general, have been conceptualized both as a
dispositional and contextual behavior (Moos, Holahan, and Beutler 2003). For the purpose of this
research we are interested in whether introducing additional environmental stressors can result in
more avoidance given a consumer’s dispositional tendency to avoid. A simple cross-tabulation of
creditor avoidance and creditor contact shows that the proportion of over-indebted consumers
who avoid creditors is much higher when being contacted by creditors compared to not being
contacted (see web appendix E), which suggests a clear circumstantial effect of creditor contact.
Nevertheless, we do not rule out the possibility of this effect being driven by an unobserved
factor. While conclusively separating the trait from the state element is not possible due to the
current cross-sectional data structure, further uncovering the mechanisms that underlie creditor
avoidance provides important directions for future research.
Implications for Policy and Practice
Finally, this research raises important concerns when it comes to effective policies for
reducing the vast sums of debt that currently remain uncollected in many parts of the world.
Clearly, policies formed under current theorizing have not closed the gap of inaction in debt
management. This research shows that effective communication in debt management is not about
fearful persuasion. Rather, consumers have some money to repay, but not enough to repay
everything in full to all creditors. We argue that to mitigate creditor avoidance, messaging tactics
need to overcome certain negative emotions that consumers have in relation to their personal
financial situations. In such circumstances, empathy, as opposed to threats, may be more
effective in connecting with consumers. There are promising examples of such empathic
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approaches to debtors, for example in the Netherlands to restructure health care payment4, or in
the UK to pre-empt rent arrears and restructure rent payments according to individual situations5.
Such solutions are based on creating a relationship of trust between the debtor and the creditor,
in which communication and debt repayments flow.
Ultimately, our findings illustrate the importance of going back to assumptions
underlying debt non-repayment. In current debt collection practices, creditors assume consumers
do not want to pay. However, there is increasing evidence that consumers often would want to
pay, but simply cannot. For example, 90% of respondents tend to agree, or strongly agree that
they would like to pay off their debt as soon as possible, while 55% of respondents tend to agree
or strongly agree that their debt means that they cannot afford to buy basic household items. In
such situations, benign messaging may not be sufficient. A more radical policy implication in
these circumstances would be targeted debt forgiveness. If indeed the reason behind avoidance
behaviors is rooted in insufficient money to repay, or consumers being willing but unable to
repay all their debts, then debt forgiveness may overall result in more, rather than less
repayment. Indeed, experience from the debt renegotiation policy intervention under the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) in the US shows that under exceptionally harsh
economic conditions, debt renegotiation on one type of debt (here, mortgage debt) can lead to
relative decline in delinquency rates of other nontargeted consumer credit and increase durable
spending (Agarwal et al. 2017). Our results suggest further experimentation with debt
forgiveness in consumer debt may be worth exploring.
4 Instituut voor Publieke Waarden (2018) “Sociaal Hospitaal”,
https://sohos.publiekewaarden.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/sohos-infograph.pdf
5 Gateway Housing Association (2017) “Rent Arrears”,
http://www.gatewayhousing.org.uk/download.cfm?doc=docm93jijm4n1038.pdf&ver=1563
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Conclusion
In sum, the findings presented in this article suggest that greater attention should be paid
to the circumstances under which consumer debt does not get repaid. Creditor avoidance is a
common behavior among the over-indebted that ultimately hurts them financially. Creditor
messaging that matches consumers’ pre-message emotional state such as debt-related shame and
guilt, as well as feelings of “drowning in debt”, can further exacerbate this behavior, eliciting a
counterproductive response. A key implication of these results is that solutions to address this
behavior may lie in a change in the ways that debt is collected.
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DATA COLLECTION INFORMATION
The Money Advice Service, an independent body in the UK that aims to improve people’s
money management, commissioned the data collection in 2012. The survey was carried out by
Public Knowledge, a market research agency. The resulting anonymized dataset freely accessible
on the web: https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/agreements/indebted_lives_report. The
first author was primarily responsible for the data analysis with input from the second author.
Data and analysis plans were discussed throughout the entire research plan by both authors.
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WEB APPENDIX
A. SAMPLE RECRUITMENT CRITERIA
Consumers were eligible to take part in the survey if they had been at least three months behind
with their bills in the last six months (objective over-indebtedness), and/or felt that their debts
were a heavy burden (subjective over-indebtedness). For the full sample (N=5020), the
distribution looks as follows:
Subjective over-indebtedness
Yes
(Debt is a heavy burden)
No
(Somewhat of a burden or
no burden at all)
Objective over-
indebtedness
Yes (1) N=1529 N=1675
No (0) N=1773 N=0
Missing data for 43 observations.
Distribution of the sample used in the analysis (N=3287):
Subjective over-indebtedness
Yes
(Debt is a heavy burden)
No
(Somewhat of a burden or no
burden at all)
Objective over-
indebtedness
Yes (1) N=1147 N=1136
No (0) N=1004 N=0
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B. BALANCE CHECK OBSERVATIONS INCLUDED (N=3,287) AND EXCLUDED
(N=1,733) IN ANALYSIS
MEAN
(N=5,020) SD
MEAN_IN
(N=3,287)
MEAN_OUT
(N=1,733)
MEAN
DIFFE
RENCE P value
Creditor Avoidance 2.67 1.41 2.77 2.42 .35 .000
Objective over-
indebtedness 0.64 .48 .69 .55 .15 .000
embarrassed_finance 2.91 1.28 2.99 2.72 .27 .000
debt_anxious 3.88 1.04 3.98 3.66 .32 .000
debt_unhappy 4.05 .98 4.13 3.87 .26 .000
own_fault 3.2 1.27 3.29 3.00 .29 .000
drown_debt 3.33 1.21 3.47 2.99 .48 .000
invdebt_notworry 4.15 1.11 4.19 4.05 .14 .000
sub_debt 0.67 .47 .65 .69 -.03 .020
keepingup_commitm
ents 3 .94 3.08 2.85 .24 .000
contact 0.47 .50 .54 .35 .19 .000
numcontact 0.76 1.06 .87 .53 .34 .000
pressuretype 0.84 1.08 .94 .65 .29 .000
neg_familylife 3.58 1.12 3.66 3.40 .26 .000
attitude_reassurance 3.12 1.10 3.21 2.94 .27 .000
attitude_incapable 2.66 1.20 2.76 2.43 .33 .000
attitude_futureless 3.22 1.27 3.30 3.02 .28 .000
attitude_encouragem
ent 3.12 1.11 3.23 2.87 .36 .000
attitude_lackofconfid
ence 2.89 1.30 2.97 2.69 .28 .000
attitude_fatalist 2.4 1.18 2.47 2.25 .23 .000
addedup_debt 2.69 1.34 2.77 2.51 .26 .000
attitude_inevitable 3.72 1.00 3.79 3.58 .21 .000
attitude_difficult 3.74 1.09 3.84 3.51 .32 .000
attitude_poverty 3.27 1.21 3.36 3.07 .29 .000
attitude_gowithout 4.1 .96 4.17 3.93 .24 .000
attitude_payoff 4.33 .84 4.37 4.23 .13 .000
attitude_control 2.73 1.14 2.63 2.96 -.33 .000
attitude_unexpected 3.8 1.06 3.88 3.60 .28 .000
attitude_debtfree 4.2 .87 4.20 4.21 -.01 .640
attitude_luxuries 4.04 1.00 4.11 3.87 .24 .000
debt_usedto 3.19 1.17 3.25 3.04 .21 .000
attitude_luxurypref 2.3 1.30 2.33 2.24 .08 .040
attitude_newcredit 2.58 1.32 2.71 2.25 .46 .000
gender 0.5 .50 .50 .52 -.02 .190
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employment - don't
know 0.02 .13 .00 .05 -.05 .000
employment - full
time employment 0.41 .49 .47 .31 .16 .000
employment - home
maker 0.08 .27 .08 .09 -.01 .360
employment - part
time employment 0.17 .37 .17 .16 .00 .840
employment - retired 0.15 .36 .13 .20 -.07 .000
employment -
student/unemployed 0.17 .38 .16 .19 -.03 .020
ownhome 0.5 .50 .50 .49 .01 .470
dependents 0.5 .50 .53 .44 .09 .000
East of England 0.09 .28 .08 .09 .00 .660
London 0.14 .35 .13 .15 -.02 .050
Midlands 0.15 .35 .15 .15 .00 .770
North East 0.05 .22 .05 .05 .00 .850
North West 0.12 .32 .12 .11 .01 .290
Northern Ireland 0.02 .15 .02 .02 .00 .640
Scotland 0.08 .27 .08 .07 .01 .280
South East 0.13 .34 .13 .13 .00 .750
South West 0.09 .28 .09 .08 .01 .170
Wales 0.05 .21 .05 .04 .00 .630
Yorkshire and The
Humber 0.09 .29 .09 .09 -.01 .500
income 2.81 1.97 2.87 2.69 .19 .000
age 5.25 2.94 5.17 5.40 -.23 .010
For definitions of attitudes, see web appendix D.
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C. COMPARING OUR SAMPLE TO THE GENERAL AND OVER-INDEBTED POPULATION
Source:
This
Study
UK Wealth and Assets
Survey Gathergood (2012a)
Kinloch et al.
(2016)
mean_IN
(N=3,287)
2012-2014
(Wave 4)
2010-2012
(Wave 3)
UK Census
2011 Indebted * Not indebted Indebted
Debt is a heavy burden .65 .20 .20
Gender .50 .51 .58 .53 .55
Economically active .64 .59 .54 .59 .68
employment - full time
employment .47
employment - part time
employment .17
employment -
student/unemployed .16 .06 .05 .085** .033** .23**
employment - home maker .08 .04 .04
employment - retired .13 .23 .31 .06 .11
ownhome .50 .66 .68 .42 .62
dependents .53 .29 .25 .34 .24 .54
Geographical spread
East of England .08 .09 .10
London .13 .13 .09
Midlands .15 .16 .17
North East .05 .04 .05
North West .12 .11 .12
Northern Ireland .02 NA
Scotland .08 .09 .09
South East .13 .14 .14
South West .09 .09 .09
Wales .05 .05 .05
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Yorkshire and The
Humber .09 .09 .09
annual gross household
income (median)
£20,000 -
£29,999 £28,600 *** NA 29700.00 40000.00
age ****
Under 14 (16) NA .19 .18 .18
18-25 (16-24) .11 .12 .09
.66
.07 .09
26-35 (25-34) .20 .14 .09 .24 .28
36-45 (35-44) .26 .13 .13 .26 .20
46-55 (45-54) .24 .14 .14 .21 .19
56-65 (55-64) .11 .11 .14 .21 .24
65+ .09 .17 .22 .16
* Gathergood (2012) also includes consumers who are 1 month behind on at least one credit item as over-indebted. In our data, we only include
consumers who are behind on, or missed any payments for credit commitments or domestic bills for any 3 or more months in the last 6 months.
** unemployed only
*** fifth gross household income decile group in 2014. The fourth decile corresponds to £22,360 (Office for National Statistics 2017).
**** age in brackets are age bands for the UK Wealth and Assets Survey
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D. ASSOCIATIONS WITH CREDITOR AVOIDANCE, ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Creditor contact .471 (.045)*** .490 (.045)*** .499 (.068)*** .524 (.067)***
Emotions
Shame .083 (.019)*** .083 (.019)*** .081 (.025)*** .078 (.025)***
Anxiety/Stress .009 (.028) .012 (.027) .039 (.033) .038 (.033)
Unhappiness .039 (.029) .042 (.028) .026 (.035) .028 (.035)
Guilt .078 (.021)*** .083 (.021)*** .068 (.027)** .075 (.027)***
Drowning in debt .145 (.024)*** .151 (.024)*** .107 (.029)*** .113 (.028)***
Worry -.005 (.022) -.006 (.021) -.068 (.028) ** -.066 (.028) **
Heavy burden -.029 (.052) -.024 (.052) -.023 (.076) -.013 (.076)
Twowayinteract
Shame x Creditor Contact .005 (.035) .011 (.035)
Anxiety/Stress x Creditor Contact -.052 (.052) -.046 (.051)
Unhappiness x Creditor Contact .033 (.050) .034 (.050)
Guilt x Creditor Contact .020 (.040) .017 (.040)
Drowning in debt x Creditor
Contact .087 (.043)** .087 (.042)**
Worry x Creditor Contact .106 (.038)*** .101 (.037)***
Heavy burden x Creditor Contact -.028 (.089) -.035 (.088)
Socio-demographics
Gender
Male b.c. b.c.
Female .049 (.040) .049 (.040)
Annual gross Income
£0 - £14,999 b.c. b.c.
£15,000 - £19,999 -.054 (.057) -.056 (.057)
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Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
£20,000 - £29,999 -.034 (.057) -.036 (.057)
£30,000 - £39,999 -.064 (.069) -.059 (.069)
£40,000 - £49,999 -.087 (.080) -.082 (.080)
£50,000 - £59,999 -.081 (.100) -.085 (.100)
£60,000 - £69,999 .132 (.129) .113 (.128)
£70,000 - £99,999 .210 (.141) .197 (.143)
£100,000 - £149,999 -.056 (.174) -.055 (.172)
£150,000 + .081 (.227) .093 (.230)
Objective over-indebtedness .255 (.057)*** .275 (.057)*** .246 (.062)*** .268 (.062)***
Keeping up commitments
Keeping up without difficulties b.c. b.c. b.c. b.c.
Struggle time to time .034 (.088) -.006 (.085) .038 (.090) .000 (.088)
Constant struggle .016 (.088) -.036 (.086) .029 (.091) -.022 (.090)
Falling behind .294 (.096)*** .246 (.094)*** .290 (.099)*** .243 (.096)**
Real financial problems .553 (.113)*** .503 (.110)*** .517 (.115)*** .469 (.112)***
Age
18 - 30 .073 (.124) .079 (.124)
31 - 40 .215 (.123)* .226 (.123)*
41 - 50 .116 (.121) .123 (.121)
51 - 60 .015 (.118) .030 (.118)
61 - 70 .052 (.103) .058 (.103)
75+ b.c. b.c.
Employment
Full-time .087 (.078) .085 (.078)
Part-time -.009 (.082) -.005 (.082)
Retired -.079 (.106) -.083 (.106)
Student / unemployed .026 (.087) .027 (.087)
Home maker b.c. b.c.
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Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Homeownership -.081 (.042)* -.080 (.042)*
Dependents .019 (.040) .015 (.040)
Geographical location
East of England b.c. b.c.
London -.087 (.082) -.072 (.082)
Midlands -.161 (.080)** -.158 (.080)**
North East -.136 (.104) -.136 (.104)
North West -.183 (.083)** -.177 (.083)**
Northern Ireland -.075 (.146) -.075 (.146)
Scotland -.242 (.089)*** -.230 (.089)***
South East -.133 (.083) -.127 (.083)
South West -.194 (.086)** -.191 (.086)**
Wales -.171 (.102)* -.161 (.102)
Yorkshire & the Humber -.033 (.087) -.015 (.087)
Attitudes
Debt Has Neg Affected Family Life .050 (.023)*** .052 (.023)***
Need reassurance that I am managing
my money in best way possible -.014 (.025) -.019 (.025)
I don't feel that I am capable of getting
my money in order myself .068 (.025)*** .067 (.025)***
I can't see that I am ever going to be in
a debt free situation .010 (.021) .006 (.020)
I need encouragement to get my
finances more under control .065 (.025)** .062 (.025)**
I don't have the confidence to
negotiate with the people I owe
money to .076 (.021)*** .082 (.021)***
If I try to sort out my money problems
I'll probably just make matters worse .135 (.023)*** .135 (.023)***
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Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d
Haven't added up debt, can't face it .164 (.020)*** .162 (.020)***
In the current economic climate living
in debt is inevitable for people like me -.004 (.022) .002 (.022)
Paying off my debt is going to be
difficult -.046 (.024)* -.050 (.024)**
My debt means I cannot always afford
to buy basic household items .031 (.021) .030 (.021)
Debt means I cannot do losts of the
things I want to in life -.026 (.030) -.024 (.030)
I would lke to pay off my debt as soon
as possible -.058 (.031)* -.058 (.031)*
I feel in control of my debt -.025 (.021) -.023 (.021)
I never expected to have this much of
debt -.052 (.024)** -.057 (.024)**
It is important to me that I am debt-
free .011 (.028) .018 (.028)
Debt means I cannot afford to buy
luxuries and treats for myself and/or
my famil -.052 (.027)* -.055 (.027)**
Used to living in debt .018 (.019) .024 (.019)
I would prefer to have luxuries and
treats than be debt free .011 (.016) .014 (.016)
I would be willing to take on a new
credit commitment to pay off my
debts -.004 (.016) .010 (.016)
_cons 1.495 (.304)*** 1.422 (.254)*** 1.479 (.311)*** 1.417 (.261)***
Number of observations 3287 3287 3287 3287
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Moderators (i.e. negative emotions, with the exception of heavy burden (binary variable)) are mean
centered to improve interpretability.
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E. CONSUMERS WHO ARE CONTACTED AVOID CREDITORS MORE FREQUENTLY
Creditor Avoidance (%)
Strongly
disagree
Tend to
disagree
Neither agree
nor disagree
Tend to
agree
Strongly
agree Total
Creditor
contact
(%)
No 37.39 29.82 14.88 15.08 2.83 100
Yes 15.27 16.63 12.84 34.79 20.48 100
Total 25.49 22.73 13.78 25.68 12.32 100
